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seen as bona fide commercial operations. This is starkly shown when one 
remembers that all of the shareholders in Permakraft (N.Z.) Ltd agreed 
to the transaction. Therefore. no "insiders" were prejudiced. Indeed, they 
were substantially benefited. In the case of a relatively small, private com- 
pany, it does not always make sense to speak of there being a benefit to 
the company, as distinct from a benefit to its members. The only real 
potential losers here were the company's creditors. 
The futurc of the "Mason" school of thought will be interesting. If his 
remarks are seen to have a wider relevance, then it could be said that 
some inconvenience and uncertainty will follow if directors of a company 
are always under an abstract duty to "take account of the intere\ts of it\ 
shareholders and it\ creditors", since there will often be insoluble prob- 
lem, of reconciling the conflicting interests of these two groups. 
M. W. RUSSELL, LL.R. (HONS) (CANTUAR),  LL.B.(CANTAB), 
1,rct~trer irz Law, University o f  Cunterbury 
LAMB v LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN: 
A CASE OF SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS 
What is the proper test of causation when a defendant's breach of duty 
does not by itself cause damage to a plaintiff but provides the opportunity 
for a deliberate and harmful intervention by a third-party'! According to 
l a r d  Sumner in a much-quotcd passage from Weld-Blunclell v Stephens:' 
"In general . . . even though A is in fault he is not responsible for injury to C, 
which B, a stranger to him, deliberately chooses to do. Though A may have 
given the occasion for B's mischievous activity, B then becomes a new and inde- 
pendent cause. . . . It is hard to steer clear of metaphors. Perhaps one may be 
forgiven for saying that B snaps the chain of causation; he is no mere conduit 
pipe, through which consequences flow from A to C, no mere moving part in a 
transmission gear set in motion by A; in a word, he insulates A from C." 
The above dictum is, perhaps, too widely stated. The original wrong- 
doing is at least one of the causes of the damage and certainly there are 
many decisions in which damage has been attributed to a defendant not- 
withstanding a deliberate intervening act by a third party. The difficulty 
comes in seeking to define the principle which allows recovery in such 
circumstances. The English Court of Appeal has recently considered this 
issue in some detail in Lamb v Landon Borough of  Camden2 but whether 
the law has thereby been clarified must, unfortunately, be regarded as 
doubtful. 
The facts of Lamb's case were as follows. The plaintiff was the owner 
of a house near Hampstead Heath. In 1972 she went to New York and let 
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the house to tenants. W111le she wac away the defendant council employed 
contractors to excavate the street in front of the house and during the 
course of this work the contractors broke a water main, cau\ing the foun- 
dation., of the house to be eroded and undermined. The tenants moved 
out, the plaintiff had her furniture put into dore and the house was Jeit 
empty. On two separate occasions there'ifter the houje was invaded by 
squatters despite attempt\ to keep them out. Before they were finally 
evicted they had done damage amounting to about £30.000. The plaintiff 
brought an action against the council claiming damages in nuisance and 
negligence. The council eventually admitted liability in respect of the dam- 
age caused by the sub4idelice alone but contended the damage caused by 
the squatters was too remote a consequence of their conduct. The caje 
went before the oficial referee on thi5 issue, who took as the appropriate 
test the following passdge from the judgment of Lord Reid in Hotize Ofiice 
v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd:  
"These cases show that, where human action forms one of the links between the 
original wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss suffered by the plaintiff, that 
action must at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be 
regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation. I do not 
think that a mere foreseeable possibility is or should be sufficient, for then the 
intervening human action can more properly be regarded as a new cause than 
as a consequence of the original wrongdoing. But if the intervening action was 
likely to happen I do not think it can matter whether that action was innocent or 
tortious or criminal." 
The official referee thought that squatting was at the material time a 
reasonably foreseeable risk but that it was nonetheless not likely to occur 
in the vicinity of the plaintiff's house. The damage caused by the squatters 
was, therefore. too remote to be recoverable. The plaintiff appealed to the 
Court of Appeal which unanimously upheld the decision of the official 
referee, but for different reasons. 
Lord Denning MR thought that the application of Lord Reid's test of 
what was 'very likely' to happen could render the Home Office liable even 
for depredations by borstai trainees negligently allowed to escape which 
were far from the vicinity of their escape. This il!ustration convinced him 
that Lord Reid's test was wrong. Further, on the facts of Stansbie v 
Trotnun? where a decorator was held to be under a duty of care to a 
householder to lock the door, it could not be said that it was very likely 
that a thief would enter. If the decision was to be justified it could only 
be because theft was reasonably foreseeable rather than likely. Lord Den- 
ning also found the 'very likely' test difficult to reconcile with The Wag012 
Mound (No. I ) j  and The Wagon Mound (No. 2).(j Yet simply to ask 
whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable would not do either. It 
would extend the range of compensation far too widely. His Lordship gave 
examples of damage that in his view was reasonably foreseeable yet ine- 
coverable: a waiter injured by a robber in a restaurant where the manage- 
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ment had taken inadequate security  precaution^;^ loss suffered by a house- 
holder whose house was burgled by a criminal negligently allowed by 
prison staff to escape; nervous shock on being told of a motor accident 
involving close  relative^.^ His Lordship concluded, returning to a familiar 
theme," that ultimately it was a question of policy as to which conse- 
quences of a wrongful act may be the subject of compensation. The rele- 
vant questions of policy here were: Whose job was it to do something to 
keep out the squatters? And if they got in, to evict them? Clearly, said 
Lord Denning, it was that of the appellant, Mrs Lamb. More broadly, his 
Lordship thought the insurance position was also a relevant factor.1° The 
risk of damage here should be borne by Mrs Lamb's insurers. If she was 
not insured, that was her misfortune. 
Oliver LJ made no overt appeal to any question of policy but rather 
sought to express his judgment in orthodox terms. He thought that all 
Lord Reid in the Dorset Yacht case was seeking to do was to draw a dis- 
tinction between 'Foreseeability as a possibility' and 'reasonable foresee- 
ability'. The finding by the official referee that the damage was foreseeable 
but unlikely constituted in effect a finding that the damage claimed was 
not such as could reu~orzabEhly be foreseen. On this basis his Lordship was 
satisfiad that the appeal should be dismissed. He nonetheless concurred 
with Lord Denning in regarding the straight test of foreseeability, at least 
in cases where the acts of independent third parties were concerned, as one 
which could, unless subjected to some further limitation, produce results 
which would extend the ambit of liability 'beyond all reason'. This Cur- 
ther limitation might, apparently, be lound in the degree of likelihood of 
third party intervention. The standard of probability required before the 
law would attribute the free act of a responsible third party to the tort- 
feasor would vary according to the circumstances: virtual inevitability 
might be appropriate in some cases. However, his 1,ordship left further 
consideration of the problem for a case in which it directly arose. 
The third member of the court, Watkins LJ, 'did not think that the test 
of reasonable foreseeability of damage laid down in The Wagon Mound 
cases should be festooned with additional words, such as 'possibility', 
'likely' or 'quite likely', supposedly for the purpose of amplification or 
qualification. However, mere application of The Wagon Mound principle 
alone could not in all circumstances conclude the question of remoteness 
because in some cases 'the very features of an event or act for which 
damages are claimed themselves suggest that the event or act is not on any 
practical view of it reinotely connected with the original act of negligence'. 
His Lordship said that the court should look at such matters as the nature 
of the event or act, the time it occurred, the place where it occurred, the 
identity and intentions of the perpetrator, the responsibility, if any, for 
' Disagreeing with the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
Chornerztowski v Red Garter Restaurant Pty Ltd (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 1070 
(affirmed (1971) 45 ALJR 71 3 (note), HC of Aust.) 
Lord Denning gave as authority the decision of the Court of Appeal in McLough- 
lin v O'Brian [I9811 Q B  599 which decision has since been reversed by the House 
of Lords ([I9821 2 WLR 982). The point nonetheless remains a valid one. 
a See Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [I9721 1 Q B  373. 
lo Relying here on Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [I9801 AC 827. 
taking measures to avoid the occurrence. and matters of public policy. A 
'robust and sensible' approach would produce an 'instinctive feeling' that 
the event or act being weighed in the balance was too remote to sound in 
damages for the plaintiff. This feeling led his Lordship to the conclusion 
that the squatters' damage was here too remote, although nonetheless 
reasonably foreseeable. 
It is, perhaps, fair to say that the judgments in Lanzb's case are not 
especially helpful in providing guidelines for future courts dealing with 
similar cases. The policy of Lord Denning MR and, possibly, of Watkins 
LJ has the merit of flexibility but demerit of uncertainty, while the dis- 
tinction drawn by Oliver LJ between foreseeability and reasonable fore- 
seeability may often border on invisibility. Yet a concept of some value 
here which the court neglected to use is found in the doctrine of risk. 
The notion of risk entails an examination of the purpose of the rule which 
has been infringed. If the rule is aimed at preventing the kind of damage 
that has occurred, that is a strong indication that the damage may then 
be recoverable. This approach seems to work satisfactorily when applied to 
those cases where a defendant has been held liable for harm caused by the 
deliberate conduct of a stranger, although the relevant judgments have not 
usually been expressed in such terms. Thus the risk posed by a decorator 
negligently leaving a house unlocked while out collecting materials is that 
a burglar may enter the house and steal some of the contents.ll The risk 
provides the reasotz for describing the conduct as negligent. Likewise, 
negligent installation or repair of a burglar alarm system gives rise to a 
risk of loss in a subsequent burglary.12 The risk in an employer sending an 
unprotected employee to collect the company payroll when an attack by 
thieves had occurred previously is that such an attack might happen again.'" 
Where a landlord lets premises to a tenant and neglects his adjoining 
vacant premises known to be haunted by tramps, he should foresee the 
risk of burglary by persons chiselling through the wall of the vacant 
premises.14 A failure by a social worker to warn the head of a community 
home of the fire-raising propensities of a I2  year old boy committed there 
from the juvenile court gives rise to a risk that the boq will not be ade- 
quately supervised and will not be prevented from setting fire to a nearby 
building.15 
On the other hand, the risk to which an accident victim is exposed on 
being left lying in the road is of further injury from other vehicles,16 not 
of being robbed while lying unconscious. The purpose of the rule that one 
should drive carefully is to safeguard others from injury, not to protect 
them from robbery. Similarly, if a motorist negligently damages another's 
car, he is not liable if a passerby steals the wheels while the car is left by 
"Stnnsbie v T r m a n  [I9481 2 KB 48. 
" lVilliams v Wormald Vigilant Ltd, High Court, Wellington, August 16 1982; 
McNeil v Village Locksmith Ltd (1982) 129 DLR (3d) 543; cp J .  Nunes Diamond 
Ltd v Dominion Electric Protection Co. (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 699. 
" Charfton v Forrest Printing Ink Co. "The Times", 19 October 1978. 
" P. Per1 (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough "The Times", 1 April 1982. 
' T i c u r  of Writtle v Essex County Council (1979) 77 LGR 657. 
'6Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112. 
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the roadside.17 The risk posed by a failure to control and supervise a 
borstal inmate is that he may cause damage in seeking to escape,Is not 
that he might run someone over at some later time when well away from 
the vicinity of the borstal.Ig Perhaps it is fair to say that the risk posed by 
negligently puncturing a water main is of damage caused by the escaping 
water rather than of squatters entering and damaging a vacated house. 
Ascertainment of the risks contemplated by a particular rule of conduct 
must to some extent be a matter of impression upon which opinions may 
differ. It is thought, nonetheless, that the above examples serve to illustrate 
the utility of the doctrine of risk in the present context. The doctrine is, 
however, of less value in solving remoteness problems where the third party 
intervention is negligent as opposed to deliberate. This is because where 
deliberate conduct is concerned the risk of intervention may constitute 
the only reason for regarding conduct as tortious whereas in the case of 
negligent conduct the risk may be only one out of a number of possibilities 
and it may be a minor one at that. Thus the ultimate damage may in some 
circumstances be of a kind within the reasonably contemplated risk yet 
irrecoverable on a broad view of the relevant events. An example is 
Knightley v J o h ~ z s , ~ ~  a further decision of the English Court of Appeal 
delivered nine days after Lamb's casez1 but by a differently coilstituted 
bench.22 
Mr Johns, the first defendant, was involved in a serious accident near 
the exit of a one-way road tunnel. The tunnel had a sharp bend in it so 
the accident could not be seen by drivers entering the tunnel. A police 
inspector who arrived at the scene of the accident realised that he had 
forgotten to close the tunnel to oncoming traffic. In breach of the police 
force's standing orders for road accidents in the tunnel he ordered two 
police ofiicers on motor cycles, one of whom was the plaintiff, to drive 
back through the tunnel against the flow of the traffic in order to close it. 
The plaintiff was hit by an oncoming motorist near the entrance to the 
tunnel while complying with this direction. The plaintiff claimed damages 
from, inter alios. the first defendant, the police inspector and the chief 
constable as being vicariously liable for the inspector's negligence. The 
first defendant conceded that he had been negligent but contended that 
the negligence of the other defendants and/or of the plaintiff caused or con- 
tributed to the accident. The trial judge found the first defendant wholly 
liable for the plaintiff's injuries. At the appeal it was found that the plain- 
tiff had not himslelf been negligent whereas the inspector was negligent in 
not closing the tunneP and in telling the plaintiff to carry out the danger- 
ous manoeuvre of driving the wrong way down the tunnel. In the light of 
these findings the Court of Appeal concluded that the inspector's negli- 
gence had been the real cause of the plaintiff's injuries and was a new 
"An example given by Oliver LJ in Lamb's case, supra at p.642. See also Duce v 
Rourke (1951) 1 WWR (NS) 305. 
"Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [I9701 AC 1004. 
"Marti v Smith and the Home office (1981) 131 NLJ 1028. 
'O [I9821 1 WLR 349. 
" Although not reported until the following year. 
" Stephenson, Dunn LJJ and Sir David Cairns. 
Sir David Cairns dissented on this point. 
came which disturbed and interrupted the sequence of events between the 
first defendant's accident and the plaintiff's accident. The inspector's 
negligence thus made the plaintiff's injuries too remote from the first 
defendant's wrongdoing to be a consequence of it. 
The damage suk1ersd by the plaint~ff here was broadly within the risk 
created by the original negligent driving. As the trial judge put it, the 
motorist ought to foresee that if he is negligent and creates an emergency, 
other people are likely to be put at risk and police, firc and ambulance 
oflicers are likely to take risks either to rescue him or protect other niem- 
bers of the public. Stephenson LJ thought that the judge was asking him- 
self the right question and applying the right law yet hi<, Lordship none- 
theless came to a different conclusion. The question he asked was whether 
thc damage that occurred was natural and probable and therefore reason- 
ably foreseeable in the sense of fore5eeability of something of the same 
sort being likely to happen as against it being a mere possibility which 
would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man or, if it did, would 
he neglected as too remote to require precautions or to impose responsi- 
bility. Tn answering this question, according to Stephenson LJH- 
"[at is helpful but not decisive to consider which of these events were deliberate 
choices to do positive acts and which were mere omissions or failures to act; 
which acts and omissions were innocent mistakes o r  miscalculations and which 
were negligent having regard to the pressures and the gravity of the emergency 
and the need to act quickly. Negligent conduct is more likely to break the chain 
of causation than conduct which is not; positive acts will more easily constitute 
new causes than inaction. Mistakes and mischances are to be expected when 
human beings, however well trained, have to cope with a crisis; what exactly they 
will be cannot be predicted, but if those which occur are natural the wrongdoer 
cannot, 1 think, escape responsibility for them and their consequences simply by 
calling them improbable or  unforeseeable. t i e  must accept the risk of some 
unexpected mischances." 
As to which mischances. the 'common sense of plain men' not the logic 
of philosophers, should be called in aid. His Lordship thought that too 
much happened here, too much went wrong, the chapter of accidents and 
mistakes was too long and varied to impose on the first defendant liability 
for what happened to the plaintiff in discharging his duty as a police 
officer. 
It may be noted that notwithstanding the expressed reliance on the 
notion of foreseeability, founded, it seems, squarely on The Wagon Mound 
( N o .  2),?" Stephenson LJ again resorted to an extraneous limiting factor, 
here described as 'common sense'. This, no doubt, is not very different 
from the 'policy' of Lord Denning MR or the 'practical view' of Watkins 
LJ. Where the courts will in future draw the line in dealing with a matter 
which depends pre-eminently on the special facts of each particular case 
necessarily remains uncertain. One helpful way of looking at the ques- 
tion is, perhaps, to consider the justice in the attribution of responsibility. 
Tn Lamh, Lord Denning MR concluded that it was the job of the plaintiff 
to keep the squatters ~ u t . ~ V n  K ightley, Stephenson LJ thought that in 
'4 [I9821 1 WLR at pp.366-367. 
" [I9671 1 AC 617. 
" [I9811 QB at  p.637. 
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trying to be fair 
Clearly, howeve] 
always rely with 
to the inspector the judge had been unfair to Mr Johns.27 
-, there is no magic formula upon which the courts can 
both certainty and confidence. 
STEPHEN TODD, LL.M. 
Senior Lecturer, University of Canterbury 
" [I9821 1 WLR at p.368. 
THE HONOURABLE D. F .  QUIGLEY'S RESIGNATION 
STRICTLY POLITICAL - NOT CONSTITUTIONAL 
June 1982 will be remembered for the Quigley affair. Precipitated by Mr 
D. F. Quigley's address to the Young Nationals on June 7,l the Prime 
Minister responded with the ultimatum that the Minister either publicly 
apologise to his Cabinet colleagues or resign. Mr Quigley resigned. The 
Prime Minister: "[Hlis speech went 'well beyond' the limits of collective 
responsibility in which cabinet ministers worked. . . [I]t went beyond that 
which was acceptable from a Cabinet Minister unless accompanied by his 
re~ignation."~ "Bear in mind that we are not talking about a backbencher." 
Said the Prime Minister: "[Tlhere is a real difference between what a 
backbencher could say and what a Minister could say."3 
It  is this appeal to the constitution avowedly vindicating the Prime 
Minister's reaction that distinguishes this political controversy from the 
many to have occurred since the closing of the thirty-seventh Parliament. 
The reference in the Prime Minister's statements is to the proclaimed con- 
stitutional convention that Minister's are 'collectively responsible' for all 
that passes in Cabinet - shed of euphemism, meaning that a Minister 
who disagrees with a Cabinet decision must either resist making known 
his dissent or resign. This at least is the theory Mr Muldoon averred: 
in the event of public disunity a Minister's resignation is constitutionally 
imperative rather than merely commendable, honourable or even in the 
Government's best interests to e n f ~ r c e . ~  Thus depending upon the par- 
ticular construction one might wish to give Mr Quigley's offending speech 
("did it or did it not breach the doctrine of collective ministerial responsi- 
bility?") it was simply a matter of the constitution claiming an able but 
dissentient Minister. 
But is not this notion of collective responsibility obligating a Minister's 
resignation novel? Fortunately, the political scientists were able to assist: 
1 " 
. . . designed to stimulate discussion. . .it is most important that a group such as 
this has the opportunity to debate the issues of the day. . .and to appreciate the 
role the government plays in the decision-making process". Christchurch Press 15 
June 1982, reproducing the full text of the Minister's speech. 
' Christchurch Press, 15 June 1982. 
Ibid. 
' See generally, S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and Ahinistrative Law (2nd ed., 
1973), at 168-177. 
